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  1ABSTRACT 
 
In naturalistic interpersonal settings, mimicry or ‘automatic imitation’ 
generates liking, affiliation, cooperation and other positive social attitudes. The 
purpose of this study was to find out whether the relationship between social attitudes 
and mimicry is bidirectional:  Do social attitudes have a direct and specific effect on 
mimicry? Participants were primed with pro-social, neutral or anti-social words in a 
scrambled sentence task.  They were then tested for mimicry using a stimulus-
response compatibility procedure. In this procedure, participants were required to 
perform a pre-specified movement (e.g. opening their hand) on presentation of a 
compatible (open) or incompatible (close) hand movement. Reaction time data were 
collected using electromyography (EMG) and the magnitude of the mimicry / 
automatic imitation effect was calculated by subtracting reaction times on compatible 
trials from those on incompatible trials.  Pro-social priming produced a larger 
automatic imitation effect than anti-social priming, indicating that the relationship 
between mimicry and social attitudes is bidirectional, and that social attitudes have a 
direct and specific effect on the tendency to imitate behavior without intention or 
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  2There is evidence that unconscious mimicry
1 promotes smooth and 
harmonious social interactions and strengthens social relationships (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). It has been demonstrated that, when people 
are not aware that their behavior is being copied, being mimicked increases rapport 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), feelings of closeness (van Baaren, Holland, Karremans & 
van Knippenberg, 2003), altruistic behavior (van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van 
Knippenberg, 2004) and trust (Bailenson & Yee, 2005). In a study where half the 
participants were mimicked by a confederate and half were not, participants who were 
mimicked reported liking the confederate more than those who were not (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999). In another study, waitresses who were instructed to mimic their 
customers received bigger tips than those who were instructed not to mimic (Van 
Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 2003). Thus, a range of studies 
suggest that unconscious mimicry is linked to increased positive social attitudes. 
Although the effects of mimicry on social attitudes have been studied 
extensively (e.g., Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1986; Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999), only a small number of studies have examined the converse relationship – the 
impact of social attitudes on mimicry. Some early research suggested that among 
romantic couples there is a correlation between the amount of rapport they feel with 
each other and the amount of mimicking that takes place during their interactions 
(Bernieri, 1988; see LaFrance, 1979, 1982; LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976 for related 
work).  Furthermore, Heider and Skowronski (submitted) have shown that individuals 
are more likely to mimic those of their own race, rather than those of a different race. 
The difference in the degree of mimicry towards own and other races was explained 
by differences in explicit and implicit racial attitudes.  
  3Two recent studies (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003, see also Lakin, Chartrand and 
Arkin, 2008; Van Baaren et al, 2003) have directly investigated the effect of social 
attitudes on mimicry. Lakin and Chartrand (2003) manipulated the extent to which 
participants aimed to affiliate with an interaction partner and found that an increased 
desire to affiliate resulted in greater mimicry. Van Baaren and colleagues varied self 
construal orientation, and found that participants with either a temporarily induced, or 
chronic, dominant interdependent self construal were more likely to match the 
behaviors of a confederate than those with an independent self construal (van Baaren, 
Maddux, Chartrand, Bouter & van Knippenberg, 2003). 
In previous research on the relationship between social attitudes and mimicry, 
including that of Lakin and Chartrand (2003) and Van Baaren et al. (2003), mimicry 
was measured by scoring matching behavior in naturalistic social interactions. In the 
majority of these studies, a participant interacted with a confederate who either shook 
their foot or rubbed their face with above average frequency. The interaction was 
recorded and subsequently scored. Judges measured the frequency of each action for 
each participant, yielding a ‘mimicry score’. For example, mimicking behavior is foot 
shaking in the presence of a foot shaking confederate and non-mimicking behavior is 
foot shaking in the presence of a face rubbing confederate. In another technique used 
by Van Baaren et al (2003), the confederate manipulated a pen, and judges then 
scored how much time each participant spent manipulating a similar pen.  
The naturalistic approach has many strengths – most notably, its ecological validity – 
but this approach inevitably leaves unanswered a number of important questions 
about the relationship between social attitudes and mimicry:  First, do social attitudes 
influence mimicry directly, or by modulating the amount of attention given by the 
participant (or ‘observer’) to the body movements of the confederate (or ‘model’)?  In 
  4the latter case, the reported effect of positive social attitudes on mimicry would be 
merely a secondary consequence of the effect of social attitudes on attention to 
interaction partners. In other words, social attitudes may influence the probability that 
a person will process or attend to a model’s body movements, but not the probability 
that attended body movements will be copied.  This kind of attentional hypothesis has 
been advanced, but not tested, by others. For example, Van Baaren et al (2003) 
suggested that an independent self-construal leads to increased attention towards the 
self and reduced attention towards others. The authors proposed that in this case 
“fewer mannerisms of others would be observed, decreasing the likelihood of 
mimicry” (p1100, van Baaren et al, 2003). Additionally, Lakin and Chartrand (2003), 
argued that, “the desire to affiliate may cause people to pay more attention to what 
occurs in their social environments (i.e. they perceive more), which would result in a 
stronger relationship between perception and behavior.” 
 
A second question concerns the specificity of the effects of social attitudes on 
mimicry: Do social attitudes influence the frequency with which observers copy the 
specific movements of a model (e.g. face rubbing, foot shaking), or merely the 
frequency with which they move the same effector, or part the body, as the model 
(e.g. hand/face movements, foot movements).  For example, an observer with a foot 
shaking model may be more likely to perform a variety of foot movements - not just 
foot shaking - than an observer with a face-rubbing model, and this difference may be 
greater when the observers have more positive social attitudes. Non-specific effects of 
this kind are known in the motor control literature as ‘effector priming’ (Bach & 
Tipper, 2007; Berger & Hadley, 1975; Gillmeister, Catmur, Brass & Heyes, in press).  
Similarly, rather than promoting copying of the specific movements of the model, 
  5positive social attitudes may enhance attention to, and thereby contact with, the object 
of the model’s movements.   For example, when a model is observed manipulating a 
pen (van Baaren et al, 2003), increased attention to the pen may result in an increase 
in frequency of all pen-directed behavior, not just the manipulative movements used 
by the model.  Effects of this kind are known in the comparative animal literature as 
‘stimulus enhancement’ (Spence, 1937) 
A third outstanding question concerns the automaticity of the mimicry that is 
modulated by social attitudes. Previous studies have shown that this kind of mimicry 
is automatic in the sense that, in post-test interviews, participants do not report 
awareness of the model’s focal behavior (e.g. foot shaking, face rubbing), an intention 
to mimic, or awareness that they mimicked the model’s behavior in the course of the 
experiment (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).  However, previous research in this area 
has not examined whether the mimicry that can be modulated by social attitudes is 
automatic in another important sense; whether it can occur even when it is counter to 
the participant’s intention. ‘Automatic imitation’ is the term used in the motor control 
literature for mimicry – copying of body movements – that occurs even when it 
conflicts with the demands of the participant’s current task, and is therefore 
understood to be un- or counter-intentional.    
Rather than assessing mimicry in a naturalistic setting, the present study used 
a stimulus-response compatibility, reaction time paradigm  (e.g. Brass, Bekkering & 
Prinz, 2000; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager & Prinz, 2001; Press, Walsh & Heyes, 
2007; Leighton & Heyes, under review; Bird, Leighton, Press & Heyes, 2007) to 
address these questions about the directness and specificity of the relationship 
between social attitudes and mimicry, and to find out whether the kind of mimicry 
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is ‘automatic imitation’.    
Each participant completed two tasks: first a social attitude priming task, and 
then an automatic imitation task. In the priming task, participants formed sentences 
from sets of words that included pro-social, neutral or anti-social terms (three groups).  
Pro- and anti-social attitudes were thus the specific type of social attitude manipulated 
in this study. In each trial of the automatic imitation task, participants were required to 
perform a pre-specified hand movement (open or close) as soon as they saw a hand on 
a computer screen begin to move.  They were required to make the same movement 
response (open or close) in every trial within a block of trials.  The nature of the hand 
movement stimulus (open or close) varied randomly over trials.  Therefore, the hand 
movement stimulus was either the same as the pre-specified response (compatible 
trials, e.g. open stimulus and open response), or the hand movement stimulus was the 
opposite of the pre-specified response (incompatible trials, e.g. close stimulus and 
open response). Previous studies using this paradigm, which did not manipulate social 
attitudes, have found an automatic imitation effect: participants make their hand 
movement responses faster in compatible than in incompatible trials (Heyes, Bird, 
Johnson & Haggard, 2005; Leighton & Heyes, under review; Press, Walsh & Heyes, 
2007; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000).  Therefore, the automatic imitation task 
provides an index of mimicry: any difference in response time between compatible 
and incompatible trials is attributable to the relationship (matching or non-matching) 
between the observed and executed actions.  
If social attitudes have a direct and specific effect on mimicry, and if the 
mimicry that they modulate is not intentional, then participants primed with pro-social 
words should show a larger automatic imitation effect than those primed with anti-




Materials and methods 
 Participants 
Thirty six consenting healthy participants with an average age of 31.3 years, 
20 male, were recruited from the University College London’s subject database and 
paid a small honorarium for their participation. All were right-handed, had normal or 
correct-to-normal vision, and were proficient in the English language. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of three groups and were all naïve with respect to the 
purpose of the experiment. The experiment was performed with local ethical 
committee approval and in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 
1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Stimuli 
In both the priming and automatic imitation tasks, stimuli were presented on a 
computer screen (60Hz, 400mm, 96DPI). Viewing was unrestrained at a distance of 
approximately 600mm. In the priming task, words were presented in color on a grey 
background. Each trial showed five words arranged horizontally across the screen. 
Words were presented in Arial, font size 24 and the color of the words varied 
randomly over trials. Words were either presented in green, blue, red or yellow. 
Three versions of the scrambled-sentence test were constructed: One was 
intended to prime the pro-social attitude, another the anti-social attitude and a third 
was intended to prime neither attitude (the neutral priming condition). For both the 
pro-social and the anti-social priming versions, 12 of the 24 trials contained an 
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priming version, the critical priming words were: affiliate, friend, cooperate, together, 
ally, associate, join, team, agree common, jointly, assist (e.g., "my she is friend 
toast"). For the anti-social priming version, the 12 critical stimuli were rebel, 
independent, individual, disagreeable, single, apart, enemy, alone, selfish, obstruct, 
obstinate, distrust (e.g., "they our enemy are fluster"). In both the pro-social and anti-
social versions, the 12 prime words were accompanied by 12 neutral words. The 
neutral prime version consisted of the 24 neutral words from the two other prime 
versions. The neutral words were raisin, pillow, bench, buy, bill, bus, back, cat, 
travel, pigeon, sunshine, tree, car, radio, form, bread, open, soldier, telephone, water 
land, glass, opera, foot (e.g., "'is raisin this hard too").  
Prior to the experiment a pilot study was carried out to verify the semantic 
relationship between the target words and the attitudes we intended to prime. A 
separate sample of 10 participants was asked to rate each word in terms of how social 
they considered it to be on a 5 point ordered category scale scale (1 = very anti-social, 
5 = very pro-social). A Friedman test indicated significant differences between pro-
social, neutral and anti-social words in terms of how ‘social’ they were judged to be 
(p=.001). The results of this pilot study are shown in Figure 2A. They confirmed that 
the stimulus words were strongly related to the attitudes that they were intended to 
prime. 
 
In the automatic imitation task, all stimuli were presented in color on a black 
background.  Each imperative stimulus was a photographic image of a human hand in 
an opened or a closed posture.  It was preceded by a warning stimulus representing a 
neutral posture of the same hand type in the same naturalistic style.  The stimuli are 
  9shown in Figure 1. Details of the size (width and height), luminance and surface area 
of the stimuli are given in Table 1. 
Procedure 
Each participant was tested individually and gave informed consent prior to 
the start of the experiment.  At the end of the experiment, each subject was fully 
debriefed about the purpose of the experiment. 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, the participant was led into the testing room 
and asked to sit at the desk facing the computer. The experimenter sat next to the 
participant and explained that the participant was to complete two short, unrelated 
experiments: the first examining the effect of color on the ability to form 
comprehensible sentences, and the second to provide information for the University 
College London Psychology department database. The experimenter provided written 
instructions for each task, and explained the procedure verbally for further 
clarification.  For the first study, participants were told that they would see five words 
arranged horizontally across the screen and that they should use four of out of the five 
words to make a complete sentence. The subjects were told to select the words by 
clicking on each one with the computer mouse.  They were told that once they had 
clicked on the fourth and final word in their created sentence, a new screen would 
appear with five different words in a different color than in the previous trial.   
  After subjects had completed the priming task they were given the instructions 
for the second part of the experiment. In this experiment the participant’s right 
forearm lay in a horizontal position. It was supported by an armrest which allowed the 
hand to move freely. The fingers moved upwards during open responses and 
downwards when closing. Stimulus movements were presented in the lateral plane 
(left–right), and therefore response movements were orthogonal to stimulus postures. 
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compatibility. After each response, participants returned their hand to a neutral 
starting position. In each block participants were instructed to make a pre-specified 
response (open or close) as soon as possible after the movement stimulus appeared. 
Participants were instructed to refrain from moving their hand in catch trials, when the 
imperative stimulus was not presented. 
All trials began with presentation of the warning stimulus. In stimulus trials, 
this was replaced 800–1500 ms later by the movement stimulus, which was of 480 ms 
duration. The stimulus onset asynchrony varied randomly between 800 and 1500 ms. 
After the movement stimulus, a blank screen was presented (3000ms) before the next 
trial. In catch trials, the warning stimulus remained on the screen for 1980 ms. Each 
block presented, in random order, 15 trials in which the hand opened, 15 trials in 
which the hand closed, and 6 catch trials. Thus, in each block, there were 15 trials in 
which the response and stimulus movements matched (‘compatible trials’) and 15 in 
which the stimulus and response movements did not match (‘incompatible trials’).  
Participants completed two blocks; in one block, subjects opened their hand in 
response to the imperative stimulus and in the second block, they closed their hand in 
response to the imperative stimulus. Whether the participants opened their hand or 
closed their hand in the first block was determined prior to the start of the experiment 
and was counterbalanced across subjects. 
Before testing commenced in each block, participants completed ten practice 
trials with the response, and to the stimuli, to be used in that block. 
Following the second block of trials, participants were asked to complete a 
debriefing questionnaire designed to ascertain whether participants has guessed the 
purpose of the experiment (see Appendix 1)   
  11Participants in the pro-social and neutral priming groups were then paid and 
informed that they were free to leave.  For ethical reasons, members of the anti-social 
priming group were given the pro-social priming task before leaving.   
 
RT Data recording and analysis 
For both open and close responses, response onset was measured by recording 
the electromyogram (EMG) from the first dorsal interosseus (FDI) muscle using 
disposable Ag/AgCl surface electrodes.  Signals were amplified, high-pass filtered at 
20Hz, mains-hum filtered at 50Hz and digitised at 2.5kHz.  They were rectified and 
smoothed using a dual-pass Butterworth filter, with a cut-off frequency of 50Hz.  
Signals were not low-pass filtered.  To define a baseline, EMG activity was registered 
for 100ms when the participant was not moving at the beginning of each trial. A 
window of 20ms was then shifted progressively over the raw data in 1ms steps. 
Response onset was defined by the beginning of the first 20ms window after the 
imperative stimulus in which the standard deviation for that window, and for the 
following 20ms epoch, was greater than 2.75 times the standard deviation of the 
baseline. This criterion was chosen during initial calibration of the equipment as the 
most effective in discriminating false positives from misses.  Whether the criterion 
correctly defined movement onset in the present experiment was verified by sight for 
every trial performed by each participant.  Stimulus onset marked the beginning, and 
EMG onset marked the end, of the response time (RT) interval. Errors were recorded 
manually.  
 
  12Results 
To remove trials in which participants did not attend to the movement 
stimulus, incorrect responses (e.g. hand open when close was required, 0.05%) were 
excluded from the analysis, as were all RTs smaller than 100 ms and greater than 
1000 ms (0.05%). On each trial, the stimulus movement was either the same as 
(compatible) or different from (incompatible) the pre-specified response. The RT data 
for each of these trial types are given in Table 2. The magnitude of the automatic 
imitation effect for each participant was calculated by subtracting RT in compatible 
trials from RT in incompatible trials. Figure 2B shows the automatic imitation effects 
for each priming group.  
Automatic imitation effects were examined using ANOVA in which group 
(pro-social, neutral anti-social) was the between subjects factor, and mean RT was the 
covariate. A main effect of priming group was found (F(2,34) = 4.042, p<0.027). 
Contrasts revealed that the pro-social group showed a significantly greater automatic 
imitation effect than the anti-social group (F(1,22) = 6.148, p<0.022), and there was  a 
significant linear trend across the three groups (p<0.008), indicating that the pro-
social group showed the largest automatic imitation effect, followed by the neutral 
group, with the anti-social group showing the smallest automatic imitation effect. No 
other contrasts approached significance. 
Examination of the questionnaire data indicated that no participant correctly 
guessed the purpose of either the first or second experiment.  Furthermore, no 
participant correctly identified a link between the studies, or a theme among the words 
presented in the priming task. Therefore, we can conclude that no participant was 
aware of the type of priming they had received or that the purpose of the study was to 
examine automatic imitation and its relationship with social attitudes.   
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Discussion 
Two previous studies, using naturalistic methodology, suggested that social 
attitudes have an influence on unconscious mimicry (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Van 
Baaren et al, 2003).  The purpose of the present study was to find out whether this 
influence is direct and specific, and to establish whether the imitative behavior that is 
modulated by social attitudes occurs, not only without conscious awareness, but also 
when counter to intention. We used, for the first time in research on mimicry and 
social attitudes, a stimulus-response compatibility paradigm. We found that people 
who had been primed with words promoting pro-social attitudes (e.g. affiliate, friend, 
cooperate, together) showed a greater automatic imitation effect that people who had 
been primed with words promoting anti-social attitudes (e.g. rebel, independent, 
individual, disagreeable).  That is, in a task where, for example, participants were 
required to open their hand in response to hand open and hand close stimuli, the 
identity of the observed movement (open or close) had a stronger influence on speed 
of responding in the pro-social than in the anti-social group.  
It is very unlikely that the relationship we found between social attitudes and 
mimicry was indirect, i.e. that it was a secondary consequence of the effects of social 
attitudes on attention to body movement stimuli.  This is because, in contrast with the 
tasks used to assess mimicry in naturalistic settings, our compatibility task required 
attention to the movement stimuli; any trials in which participants did not attend were 
detected by checking for incorrect responses, and for abnormally long or short 
reaction times, and these trials were excluded from the analysis.   
  14Furthermore, the effect that we observed could not have been non-specific: 
due to a tendency to move the same body part (effector priming), or to touch the same 
object (stimulus enhancement), as the model, rather than to produce the same body 
movements as the model (mimicry or imitation).  The effect cannot be attributed to 
effector priming because we used two movements (open and close) of the same 
effector (the right hand), and it cannot have been due to stimulus enhancement 
because neither of the movements involved manipulation of an object.   
Thus, our results indicate that there is a direct and specific causal relationship 
between social attitudes and mimicry.  In addition, they suggest that the mimicry that 
can be modulated by social attitudes is, not only unconscious, but also beyond 
intentional control. In the compatibility paradigm used in this study, the identity of the 
movement made by the stimulus hand (open or close) was task-irrelevant; the 
movement of the stimulus hand was just a ‘go signal’ telling participants when to 
respond, but not which response to make.  Rather, the participant’s task, and therefore 
their intention, was to make the pre-specified response as quickly as possible in every 
trial.  Therefore, slower responding in incompatible than in compatible trials (the 
index of mimicry or automatic imitation) was counter-intentional.  
This point highlights an important difference between the design of the present 
study and that of Van Baaren et al (2003), and Lakin and Chartrand (2003).  In all 
three studies mimicry was automatic. Participants were unaware that their actions 
were affected by the actions they observed, and they had no intention to mimic. 
However, in the Van Baaren et al and Lakin and Chartrand studies observation of 
action caused participants to initiate imitative actions and therefore mimic their 
interaction partner. Therefore, the tendency to mimic their interaction partner 
following pro-social priming resulted in the performance of imitative actions. In the 
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performance of a pre-specified action, such that imitative actions were performed 
faster than non-imitative actions. The effect of the pro-social priming was therefore to 
increase the effect of an automatic tendency to mimic, rather than to increase the 
degree of mimicry. Despite this difference, both sets of studies found an increased 
tendency to mimic following pro-social priming. This result allows one to conclude 
that pro-social priming may influence not only action selection, but also the on-line 
control of action. 
When performing the compatibility task, participants observed movements of 
an isolated human hand on a computer screen; they did not interact live with a whole 
person.  Therefore, the findings suggest that social attitudes can modulate mimicry of 
body movements, not only in the rich context of naturalistic social interactions, but 
also in a minimal social context.  This, in turn, implies that the cognitive mechanisms 
mediating this kind of mimicry are relatively low-level; that they do not depend on 
complex processing of a wide range of social stimuli. 
The associative sequence learning model (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Heyes, 2001; 
Heyes, 2003; Heyes & Ray, 2000) suggests that mimicry is mediated by low-level 
mechanisms in which activation of a sensory representation of a body movement (e.g. 
by visual attention to that movement) necessarily results in activation of a motor 
representation of the same movement (and thereby an impulse to perform the 
movement), provided that the sensory and motor representations have become linked 
through previous, correlated experience of observing and executing the movement.  If 
this is correct, then in principle social attitudes could modulate mimicry via an 
attentional route - by influencing the probability that sensory representations of body 
movement will be activated - or via an inhibitory route - by influencing the degree to 
  16which activation of motor representations by associated sensory representations is 
suppressed to prevent overt performance of the represented movement.    
The results of the present study suggest that social attitudes do not affect 
mimicry via an attentional route (see above).  Further experiments will be necessary 
to establish whether, for example, positive social attitudes lead to the release of 
inhibition of mimicking motor output, and, if so, whether the inhibitory mechanisms 
that are subject to such modulation are task-general (Logan, 1994) or specifically 
involved in regulating social responses (Brass & Spengler, in press).  The statistical 
analysis of the present experiment provided some evidence that the neutral priming 
group showed an automatic imitation effect smaller than that of the pro-social priming 
group, but larger than that of the anti-social priming group.  This raises the possibility, 
also requiring further investigation, that pro-social attitudes lead to a decrease, and 
anti-social attitudes to an increase, in inhibition of mimicking responses relative to 
baseline levels of inhibition.  
  The results of studies investigating the effect of mood on cognition are 
consistent with the hypothesis that social attitudes modulate mimicry via their effects 
on inhibitory mechanisms.  Positive mood, which is associated with prosocial 
attitudes, can lead to poor performance on Stroop inhibition tasks (Phillips, Bull, 
Adams & Fraser, 2002), increased distractibility (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004), and 
impairment of the ability to distinguish self from others (Stroessner, Mackie & 
Michalsen, 2005). Brass and colleagues have argued that susceptibility and resistance 
to automatic imitation depend on inhibitory mechanisms that allow one's own actions 
to be distinguished from the observed actions of others (Brass, Derrfuss & Cramon 
2005). Therefore, it is possible that positive social attitudes promote, and negative 
  17social attitudes reduce, automatic imitation via mood-mediated effects on inhibitory 
mechanisms.  
The results of this study also have implications with respect to the social 
function of mimicry.   Previous research has shown that being mimicked promotes 
pro-social behavior (e.g. Chartand & Bargh, 1999), and consequently it has been 
suggested that mimicry is a non-conscious tool that individuals use instinctively to 
facilitate social interactions with others (Chartrand & Jeffers, 2003, Cheng & 
Chartrand, 2003, Lakin & Chartrand, 2003).  By confirming that the relationship is 
bidirectional, and that the effect of pro-social attitudes on mimicry is both direct and 
specific, the present study suggests that mimicry and social attitudes are part of a 
positive feedback loop in which pro-social attitudes generate mimicry, and mimicry 
further increases positive social attitudes.   This relationship may be ‘instinctive’ or a 
product of social learning; for example, humans may have an innate tendency to 
mimic more when they are in an affiliative frame of mind, or we may learn through 
interaction with others that it is under these circumstances that mimicry tends to be 
most rewarding.  In either case, it is likely that positive, bidirectional  feedback 
between social attitudes and mimicry, not only facilitates day-to-day social 
interactions, but has played an important role in the evolution of human cooperation 






  18Notes 
1.  Copying of familiar, observed body movements is known as mimicry in the 
literature on social interaction, and as imitation or automatic imitation in cognitive 
neuroscience.  Here we use mimicry and automatic imitation as synonyms or, as 
indicated in the text, automatic imitation as a subset of mimicry which is not subject 




















  19Appendix 1 -Debriefing Questionnaire 
 
What do you think the purpose of the first experiment was? 
What do you think the purpose of the second experiment was? 
What do you think the first experiment was trying to study? 
What do you think the first experiment was trying to study? 
Did you think that any of the tasks were related in any way? If yes, in what way? 
Did anything you did on one task affect anything you did in another task? If yes, then 
how did it affect you? 
When you were arranging the words, did you notice anything unusual about the 
words? 
Did you notice a pattern or theme to the words? 
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Figure 1.  Examples of two of the four trial types used in the automatic imitation task. 
Response movements were made in the horizontal plane and stimulus postures were 
presented in the vertical plane. Therefore, the direction of response movements was 
orthogonal to that of stimulus movements.   
 
Figure 2. A) Mean scores for each group of prime words on a 5 point scale (1 = very 
anti-social, 5 = very pro-social). B) Mean magnitude of the automatic imitation effect 
(RT in incompatible trials minus RT in compatible trials) for each of the three priming 

















Table 1. Visual angle, luminance and surface area values for each posture in the 
stimulus format. Relative luminance was measured on a scale between 0 (completely  
black) and 255 (completely white). 
 
Table 2. Mean RTs  and standard error, in milliseconds (ms), for participants in each 












































































































































































































Table 2.  




Pro-social  313.3 (25.3)  351.3 (31.2) 
Neutral  289.5 (16.7)  315.1 (17.5) 
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